103 research outputs found

    Popular Matchings in Complete Graphs

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    Our input is a complete graph G=(V,E)G = (V,E) on nn vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in GG. Our goal is to construct a matching in GG that is popular. A matching MM is popular if MM does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching MM', where each vertex casts a vote for the matching in {M,M}\{M,M'\} where it gets assigned a better partner. The popular matching problem is to decide whether a popular matching exists or not. The popular matching problem in GG is easy to solve for odd nn. Surprisingly, the problem becomes NP-hard for even nn, as we show here.Comment: Appeared at FSTTCS 201

    Popular Roommates in Simply Exponential Time

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    We consider the popular matching problem in a graph G = (V,E) on n vertices with strict preferences. A matching M is popular if there is no matching N in G such that vertices that prefer N to M outnumber those that prefer M to N. It is known that it is NP-hard to decide if G has a popular matching or not. There is no faster algorithm known for this problem than the brute force algorithm that could take n! time. Here we show a simply exponential time algorithm for this problem, i.e., one that runs in O^*(k^n) time, where k is a constant. We use the recent breakthrough result on the maximum number of stable matchings possible in such instances to analyze our algorithm for the popular matching problem. We identify a natural (also, hard) subclass of popular matchings called truly popular matchings and show an O^*(2^n) time algorithm for the truly popular matching problem

    Matchings, Critical Nodes, and Popular Solutions

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    We consider a matching problem in a marriage instance G. Every node has a strict preference order ranking its neighbors. There is a set C of prioritized or critical nodes and we are interested in only those matchings that match as many critical nodes as possible. Such matchings are useful in several applications and we call them critical matchings. A stable matching need not be critical. We consider a well-studied relaxation of stability called popularity. Our goal is to find a popular critical matching, i.e., a weak Condorcet winner within the set of critical matchings where nodes are voters. We show that popular critical matchings always exist in G and min-size/max-size such matchings can be efficiently computed

    Fairly Popular Matchings and Optimality

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    We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph G = (A ? B, E) where vertices have strict preferences over their neighbors. A matching M is popular if for any matching N, the number of vertices that prefer M is at least the number that prefer N; thus M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. It is easy to find popular matchings; however when there are edge costs, it is NP-hard to find (or even approximate) a min-cost popular matching. This hardness motivates relaxations of popularity. Here we introduce fairly popular matchings. A fairly popular matching may lose elections but there is no good matching (wrt popularity) that defeats a fairly popular matching. In particular, any matching that defeats a fairly popular matching does not occur in the support of any popular mixed matching. We show that a min-cost fairly popular matching can be computed in polynomial time and the fairly popular matching polytope has a compact extended formulation. We also show the following hardness result: given a matching M, it is NP-complete to decide if there exists a popular matching that defeats M. Interestingly, there exists a set K of at most m popular matchings in G (where |E| = m) such that if a matching is defeated by some popular matching in G then it has to be defeated by one of the matchings in K

    Popular Matchings with One-Sided Bias

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    Let G = (A ? B,E) be a bipartite graph where A consists of agents or main players and B consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching M is popular if for any matching N, the number of vertices that prefer M to N is at least the number that prefer N to M. Popular matchings always exist in G since every stable matching is popular. A matching M is A-popular if for any matching N, the number of agents (i.e., vertices in A) that prefer M to N is at least the number of agents that prefer N to M. Unlike popular matchings, A-popular matchings need not exist in a given instance G and there is a simple linear time algorithm to decide if G admits an A-popular matching and compute one, if so. We consider the problem of deciding if G admits a matching that is both popular and A-popular and finding one, if so. We call such matchings fully popular. A fully popular matching is useful when A is the more important side - so along with overall popularity, we would like to maintain "popularity within the set A". A fully popular matching is not necessarily a min-size/max-size popular matching and all known polynomial time algorithms for popular matching problems compute either min-size or max-size popular matchings. Here we show a linear time algorithm for the fully popular matching problem, thus our result shows a new tractable subclass of popular matchings

    Popular Half-Integral Matchings

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    In an instance G = (A union B, E) of the stable marriage problem with strict and possibly incomplete preference lists, a matching M is popular if there is no matching M0 where the vertices that prefer M\u27 to M outnumber those that prefer M to M\u27. All stable matchings are popular and there is a simple linear time algorithm to compute a maximum-size popular matching. More generally, what we seek is a min-cost popular matching where we assume there is a cost function c : E -> Q. However there is no polynomial time algorithm currently known for solving this problem. Here we consider the following generalization of a popular matching called a popular half-integral matching: this is a fractional matching ~x = (M_1 + M_2)/2, where M1 and M2 are the 0-1 edge incidence vectors of matchings in G, such that ~x satisfies popularity constraints. We show that every popular half-integral matching is equivalent to a stable matching in a larger graph G^*. This allows us to solve the min-cost popular half-integral matching problem in polynomial time

    New Pairwise Spanners

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    Let G = (V,E) be an undirected unweighted graph on n vertices. A subgraph H of G is called an (all-pairs) purely additive spanner with stretch beta if for every (u,v) in V times V, mathsf{dist}_H(u,v) le mathsf{dist}_G(u,v) + beta. The problem of computing sparse spanners with small stretch beta is well-studied. Here we consider the following relaxation: we are given psubseteq V times V and we seek a sparse subgraph H where mathsf{dist}_H(u,v)le mathsf{dist}_G(u,v) + beta for each (u,v) in p. Such a subgraph is called a pairwise spanner with additive stretch beta and our goal is to construct such subgraphs that are sparser than all-pairs spanners with the same stretch. We show sparse pairwise spanners with additive stretch 4 and with additive stretch 6. We also consider the following special cases: p = S times V and p = S times T, where Ssubseteq V and Tsubseteq V, and show sparser pairwise spanners for these cases

    Popular Matchings in Complete Graphs

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    Our input is a complete graph G = (V,E) on n vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globally stable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching M\u27: here each vertex casts a vote for the matching in {M,M\u27} where it gets a better assignment. Popular matchings need not exist in the given instance G and the popular matching problem is to decide whether one exists or not. The popular matching problem in G is easy to solve for odd n. Surprisingly, the problem becomes NP-hard for even n, as we show here
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